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Dynamic Secrets and Secret Keys Based Scheme
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Neetesh Saxena, Member, IEEE, and Santiago Grijalva, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—An integrated and optimized smart grid cannot be
achieved without a secure communication network. Due to the
large-scale nature of the power system, the variety of technologies
used, and limitations of communication bandwidth, supervisory
applications for smart grid still use weak security in many
deployments. Adversaries can potentially modify measurement
values or inject bad commands over the network. In this paper,
we propose a novel scheme based on dynamic secrets and
encryption with secret keys. The scheme generates a series of
dynamic secrets over the communication network, which are used
to generate secret keys for data encryption. The generation of
dynamic secret is frequent and no adversary can compromise
the network for a longer period, even if he/she knows a secret
key. The scheme is secure against eavesdropping, malicious com-
munication injection, man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack,
impersonation attack, and chosen-plaintext attack. The security
analysis and performance evaluation show that our scheme is
feasible to be used in the communication between supervisory
and control nodes of various smart grid applications.
Index Terms—Smart grid security, dynamic secret, secret key,
secure wireless communication, measurement data.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Smart Grid (SG) is a promising platform that willbring utility electricity delivery systems into the 21st cen-
tury by using two-way digital communications technologies
and computer-based distributed control and automation [1],
[2]. Today’s electric power grid is being extended with several
advanced power technology features, such as sensing, dynamic
power flow analysis, real-time situation control analysis, etc.
A communication network in the smart grid can be realized
using various wired and wireless technologies overlaid on
the power system. Several short-range wireless technologies,
such as Zigbee, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi, as well as wide-range
wireless technologies, such as WiMAX, UMTS, and LTE are
used in the smart grid [3], [4]. The security of the smart grid
network also affects the availability, reliability, and efficiency
of the power system. The integration of the communication
network with the power system though causes important
security challenges and exposes vulnerabilities, including the
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potential for various types of attacks, such as Man-in-the-
Middle (MITM) attacks, replay attacks, and impersonation
attacks [5]. Several researchers have demonstrated numerous
mechanisms for attacks, which can take place in a smart grid
setting [6]. It is therefore necessary to implement a cyber
security element on top of the communication layer, which
itself is conceptually implemented at the top of power system
layer.
When the communication network is not secure, it is always
possible for an adversary to perform security attacks. Consider
the case where adversary A identifies vulnerabilities with the
intention to compromise power system data and to disrupt
power devices and apparatus. In case of secure communication
network, adversary A still tries to capture the underlying sys-
tem secrets, such as shared keys in symmetric communication
or private keys used in asymmetric communications.
In this paper, we consider generic smart grid applications
that have a Supervisory Node (SN) and a Control Node (CN),
as shown in Figure 1. Here, a supervisory node can correspond
to the control center, the aggregator, or a microgrid controller.
The control node is closer to the electrical devices and can
correspond to a substation Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), an
Intelligent Electronic Device (IED), the electric vehicle, the
smart meter etc. One example is the communication between
the control center and the substation RTU. During polling
request, the control center (SN) asks all the RTUs (CN)
to send their periodic data and as a polling response, all
the RTUs transmit their data to the control center over the
network. The communications between the supervisory node
and control nodes at the substations may use protocols, such
as Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3), defined in IEEE Std.
1815-2010 [7]. The DNP3 protocol has several known security
issues, such as absence of authentication, message integrity,
and confidentiality of the message information. In 2012, a
new version of the DNP3 protocol, named DNP3 secure
authentication version 5, was announced [8]. This version of
DNP3 provides methods to remotely change user update keys
using either symmetric or asymmetric cryptography. However,
this version defeats only spoofing, modification, and replay
attacks over the network, and does not provide confidentiality
to the message. This version is not backward compatible,
which results in significant protocol replacement effort and
cost. An alternative is to develop a cyber-security layer that
can handle security issues over the communication network.
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Fig. 1: A communication scenario between the supervisory node and the control node at a substation.
The DNP3 protocol is based on a simplified model, named
Enhance Performance Architecture (EPA) that consists of three
layers: data-link layer, application layer, and transport pseudo
layer. The transport pseudo layer partitions large messages
into smaller messages that the data-link layer is capable of
handling. Application, transport, and data-link layers in the
transmitter add information to the message for enabling the
same layers in the receiver to correctly process the messages
[9]. If the message is very large, fragmentation of the message
is performed over the application layer. Then, segmentation
of each fragment is done by the transport pseudo layer,
and thereafter segments fit into data-link layer frames. The
DNP3 data-link layer frames are transmitted across the IP
network using Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) or User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets. In addition, the control
node can also send unsolicited responses to the supervisory
node. These are messages sent from a control node without
a specific response to the supervisory node, when something
of significance occurs. However, to make this possible, the
supervisory node should be able to accept such messages from
any control node at any time.
A. Research Problem and Challenges
Various wireless technologies are applied to meet specific
requirements of the smart grid network. However, wireless
communications lead to many potential vulnerabilities that
provide a room for the adversary to steal the secrets (keys
and private information). Also, the user is often not aware of
the fact whether the secret is stolen or not.
During data acquisition, the supervisory node sends a poll
request to each control node, and each control node dumps
its data in a series of the DNP3 packets to the supervisory
node. Adversary A, present between the supervisory node and
the control node, may compromise the transmitted information
of the packets. A can also alter the measurement values in
the transmitted packets [10]. As a result, the power system
may become insecure. Therefore, the smart grid network must
have a security scheme to protect these information over
the communication network. The scenario considered has the
following challenges:
1) Since each control node frequently communicates with
the supervisory node in order to transmit measurement
values, the scheme must be very efficient and should
generate communication overhead as low as possible.
2) The storage and computation capabilities are limited at
the control node. Hence, any over burden of computation
decreases the efficiency of the system. The proposed
solution must hence be lightweight in terms of lower
storage and computational requirements.
3) As various control nodes and the supervisory node are
deployed at different geographical locations, the system
recovery from a critical security issue (over a wide
communication network) may result in a significant delay.
Therefore, a solution that is capable of self-managing is
needed that can quickly recover the system from insecure
state, and can be implemented independently from third-
party involvement.
4) The transmission of information over the communication
network between the control node and the supervisory
node experiences many security attacks, such as reply
attacks, MITM attacks, and impersonation attacks. Such
attacks must be defeated by a security solution.
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TABLE I: Symbols And Abbreviations
Symbol Description Size (bits)
SN Supervisory node –
CN Control node –
H() Hash function –
PT Plaintext Variable
CT Ciphertext Variable
idcn/idsn Identity of the entity 128
DScn/DSsn Dynamic secret 160-384
SKcn/SKsn Shared key between SN -CN 160-384
T Timestamp 64
h Hash value 160-384
B. Our Contribution
We propose a novel dynamic secret scheme for secure
communications between the supervisory node and the control
node implementing stop-and-wait protocol. Our solution is
based on wireless transmission errors and randomness, as well
as the security of hash functions. In our proposed scheme, a
shared secret key is automatically generated at the supervisory
node and the control node by a dynamic secret, and is used
to encrypt and decrypt the data. This allows the following:
1) Transmission of encrypted measurement values, such as
line active and reactive power, transformer current mag-
nitude, and voltage magnitude and phase with message
integrity from the control node to the supervisory node
over the network.
2) Generation of a series of dynamic secrets and then
obtains the secret keys using a lightweight technique
based on hash functions and XOR operations. This overall
scheme generates lower computation overhead as well as
manageable communication overhead depending upon the
quantity of measurement values to be delivered in each
packet.
3) Frequent generation of dynamic secrets and shared secret
keys in the system that always self-manage and recover
the system, even if A retrieves a dynamic secret and/or
secret key.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents related work in the context of dynamic secrets, hash
functions, and encryption schemes. Section 3 presents the
adversary model. Section 4 proposes and presents our scheme
that generates dynamic secrets and secret keys, and performs
encryption over measurement data. Section 5 and Section
6 present security analysis, and performance evaluation and
prototype experimental analysis, respectively. Finally, Section
7 concludes the work. Table I describes abbreviations and
symbols used in this paper along with their descriptions and
sizes.
II. RELATED WORK
This section presents related work on the smart grid wireless
communication security schemes. Schemes [11] and [12] are
based on physical layer security, while schemes [13], [14],
[15], [16] are based on data-link layer security. Capar et al.
[11] implemented elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman secret sharing
technique using a fast frequency hopping method, whereas
Wong et al. [12] proposed a secret sharing scheme using
relaiability-based hybrid automatic-repeat-request over the fast
fading channel. Sheng et al. [13] and Xiao et al. [14] proposed
a method for securing communications in a wireless network
by utilizing inherent randomness of propagation errors to
generate a secret key. Sun et al. [15] used the idea in
[13] of generating dynamic secrets at the data link layer,
however, its traditional message encryption with DES and AES
generates a very large overhead. Furthermore, Liu et al. [16]
proposed a Dynamic Secret-based Encryption scheme (DSE)
for the smart grid communication. This scheme generates re-
transmission sequence to obtain Dynamic Secret (DS), and
then computes Dynamic Encryption Key (DEK). However,
encryption function used in the scheme seems insecure, as
it performs an XOR between the plaintext and the secret key,
and does not provide randomness to the input. Same plaintext
will produce the same ciphertext, which may reveal the secret
key.
Many symmetric key algorithms, such as Triple-DES and
AES have been proposed to be used in the smart grid network
[17]. Furthermore, many researchers have used asymmetric
key algorithms based on specific needs. Some algorithms
based on latest cryptographic techniques, such as homomor-
phic encryption for secure aggregation [18] and mutli-party
computation for different applications [19], have also been
proposed for the smart grid network, which allow performing
specific but limited operations over the encrypted data. How-
ever, these algorithms are not efficient in practice due to high
speed and lightweight requirements. Moreover, symmetric key
algorithms are faster than asymmetric key algorithms, but they
have a short lifespan. Our system requirements do not fit well
with using the traditional symmetric and/or asymmetric key
algorithms. We tackle this problem by designing a new secure
lightweight encryption algorithm.
Our work is different from the existing works and provides
the following:
(a) Dynamic secret scheme implemented at the data-link
layer as well as at the transport pseudo-layer instead of
just working at the data-link layer [13], [15], [16] or the
physical layer [11], [12] only. This enables the extension
of security features at the transport pseudo-layer, as the
smart grid network supports IP-based communications.
(b) Use of a set of hash functions instead of a single hash
function to generate dynamic secrets, and to maintain data
integrity.
(c) Use DNP3/C37.118 format for data delivery, which are
wrapped inside the TCP/UDP packets. The beauty of the
DNP3 packet is that it can support sending a set of data
blocks in a single packet. When A performs attacks over
the network, such as MITM attacks, and tries to make an
attempt of extracting data, most likely our scheme will
generate a new dynamic secret and secret key soon that
will quickly recover the system.
(d) Propose an encryption function, which is based on XOR
operations, randomness of input, and freshness of the
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secret key. This encryption function is secure against
Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA) and is different than the
function used in [16], which is based on a single XOR
operation between the plaintext and the secret key. The
encryption function in [16] is not secure as repetition of
same plaintext to be encrypted under the same key may
reveal plaintext to A.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
It is hard to perform perfect eavesdropping without losing
information over the wireless network, even for a short period
of time [13]. We assume that A tries to perform eavesdropping
over the wireless network. The devices and users usually are
not aware of a secret key being stolen, until A performs an
active attack. We further assume that A can steal dynamic
secret and decrypts the ciphertext, and makes an attempt
to inject malicious communications. We also assume that A
knows the possible selection of hash functions used in our
scheme and tries to learn information from the generated hash.
As the communications between the supervisory node and the
control node take place in the plaintext form, A can easily
capture relevant information over the network. Moreover, A
can also attempt an man-in-the-middle attack by establishing
two active connections, one between the supervisory node and
A, and other between A and the control node, and tries to
modify or extract message information. A can also tries to
perform impersonation attacks on behalf of the supervisory or
control node.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we describe a novel scheme to mitigate
communication vulnerabilities between the supervisory node
and the control node. Our scheme presents a lightweight dy-
namic secret-based encryption scheme. Our goal is to generate
a shared Dynamic Secret (DS) through a publicly known
function and to make sure that A does not know the DS. In the
wireless communication, it is almost impossible to eavesdrop
link layer communication for a long period without errors [13].
The shared secret key is frequently and dynamically computed
by the supervisory node as well as the control node. These
shared secret keys are used to encrypt measurement values
as well as unsolicited responses. A communication scenario
with our proposed scheme is shown in Figure 2. We use hash
functions, XOR, and other low computation based operations
in our scheme in order to keep overheads as low as possible.
A. Dynamic Secrets and Encryption of Measurement Values
We propose a lightweight scheme that keeps the system
secrets secure and also self-manages the security of the system,
even if a secret is leaked over the network. This is possible
by observing the fact that losing information over the wireless
network is generic due to wireless transmission errors. The
scheme generates a set of hash values at different time intervals
at the supervisory node as well as at the control node in
Fig. 2: A scenario of secure delivery of measurement values
over the network.
order to maintain data integrity of measurement values. The
supervisory node and the control node compute hash on the
total number of successful delivery of (i) transmitted frames
of all the packets (pkt) as well as (ii) each packet itself,
and (iii) correctly received acknowledgments (ack). Note that
long messages are usually segmented and de-segmented at the
sender and the receiver ends, respectively. This is the reason
that we also count successful delivery of each packet. How-
ever, adversary A cannot keep its eyes over the transmitted
channel all the time. A cannot predict the actual value of
successful transmitted pkt and ack due to frame/packet loss.
If A misses even a single frame, it cannot retrieve the lost
value. As a result, A will have a different computation value.
Hence, A cannot generate the same dynamic secret.
Our scheme also provides an insight of a desirable com-
putation model, in which A makes more efforts in order to
retrieve the dynamic secret, not only for the current secret key
but also for all the subsequent secret keys being generated in
next few minutes. On the other hand, the supervisory node and
the control node generate a dynamic secret using the shared
information, hash values, and other operations.
1) Generation of Dynamic Secrets: In the presence of a
potential adversary A, it may happen that a single dynamic
secret may not be sufficiently secured. However, with a series
of new and frequently generated dynamic secrets, A will not
be able to derive or capture all the secrets due to information
loss. Nevertheless, the system may still be vulnerable, if the
encryption function is not properly designed or selected from
the existing secure ciphers.
Initially, the supervisory and the control nodes mutually
agree on a predefined starting value str (a set of octets)
as an initial secret generated by using Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [22]. Note that Diffie-Hellman key exchange allows
the generation of secret str at both ends without actually
sent it over the network. The public parameters are sent over
the network whereas the private parameters are kept secret.
Thereafter, the control node sends a few random streams to the
supervisory node for generating a dynamic secret at both ends.
This makes even more difficult for A to retrieve or compute
the correct secret. If A does not start from the beginning, it
cannot recover the lost information, and therefore, will not be
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able to generate the correct dynamic secret. The generation of
dynamic secrets at the control node and the supervisory node
are described in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, respectively.
Note that for each control node, the IP address of the super-
visory node, i.e., snaddri , may be same with different port
numbers and/or interfaces. We count the successful delivery
of each frame of a packet and the completion of a packet
delivery with message integrity as the total count computed
by the supervisory node and the control node. We refer to the
count value as cn count and sn count at the control node
and the supervisory node, respectively. Here, 1 and 2 are
reasonable propagation times of a packet to be received by the
supervisory node and the control node, respectively. The str is
a pre-shared string shared between each control node and the
supervisory node to initialize Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2,
and is different for each control node-supervisory node pair.
Also, the adversary has no knowledge about the length of
the random string and the actual length of the information to
predict the counter value. A single bit changed the counter
value will result in a significant change in the hash of the
counter. In order to make the process more strong, we consider
the length of counter at least 128 bits, which will provide
2128 possible combinations. The actual counter value starts
with (str+counter) value. The adversary does not have the
correct knowledge about the delivery failure of exact number
Algorithm 1 Count Generation at the Control Node
count = 0;
for each sent packet pkti do
create frames frmi of the message msgi;
define cnaddri and snaddri to each packet;
compute a hash of its identity H(idcni ||str) and
generate a timestamp tcn1 ;
create hashi = H(H(idcni ||str)||msgi||tcn1) over the
pkti payload and append it to the msgi;
send packet pkti to the supervisory node with msgi as
H(idcni ||str)|| msgi||hashi||tcn1 ;
while ! end of sent packets per session do {
wait for acknowledgments acki of all frmi as well as pkti;
if all acki are received within tcn2 ≤ tsn2 + 2 then
proceed;
else
set pkt flagj = 1 for all missing frmj’s ackj ;
for each correct frame acki do
set count++;
for each correct packet acki do
set count++;
set pkt flagi = 0;
for each unsuccessful frame of the packet pktj
(no ackj or negative ackj) do
if pkt flagj == 1 then
re-transmit the missing frame frmj to the
supervisory node;
}
set cn count = count;
Algorithm 2 Count Generation at the Supervisory Node
count = 0;
for each received packet pkti do
receive frames frmi of message msgi;
verify snaddri and sender cnaddri in each packet;
if (timestamp tsn1 ≤ tcn1 + 1) && (current timestamp
tcurr ≤ tsn1 ) are true then
proceed and store H(idcni ||str);
else
terminates the connection;
if all the frames are received within tsn1 then
proceed;
else
wait for a random time trand;
if updated timestamp tcurr ≤ tsn1 + trand is true then
proceed;
else
terminates the connection;
if message integrity hashi
?
= hash
′
i of the receive msgi
in packet pkti from the control node holds then
proceed;
else
terminates the connection;
while ! end of received packets per session do {
send acknowledgments acki for all received frames frmi
as well as the pkti;
for each correct frame frmi do
set count++;
for each correct packet pkti do
set count++;
set pkt flagi = 0;
for each unsuccessful frame of the packet pktj
(no ackj or negative ackj) do
set pkt flagj = 1;
wait to receive missing frame frmj from the
control node;
}
set sn count = count;
of packets and frames over the wireless network. In addition,
there is no need of synchronization, as both ends generate
counter value based on successful delivery of the frames and
packets and the acknowledgments received. If a control node
is reset, the process starts again. Since str is generated using
secure Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the adversary cannot
retrieve the value of str in any case. Also, it is very hard
(almost impossible) for an adversary to keep track of all the
successful delivery of frames, packets, and acknowledgments
due to wireless transmission errors. Hence, the adversary
cannot derive the actual value of the counter, which is str
+ counter. In the worst scenario, if an adversary retrieves the
encrypted strings, it cannot decrypt the messages, because it
cannot derive dynamic secret and secret key considering the
fact that the adversary cannot obtain correct and actual counter
value.
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2) Generation of Secret Keys: The processes of deriving
secret keys from the generated dynamic secrets at the control
node and the supervisory node are as follow:
Generation of Dynamic Secrets and Secret Keys at the CN:
The control node generates a dynamic secret as:
DScni = H(cn count);
and the corresponding secret key as:
SKcni = (DScni ⊕ str);
Here, i represents the iteration number to generate the dynamic
secret and the secret key. This secret key is used to encrypt
measurement values in the packets in order to transmit them
securely over the network from the control node to the
supervisory node. However, it is important to verify whether
the generated key is sufficiently eligible to generate secure
symmetric cipher. For example, the generated SKcni may
be short in length because of many most significant bits as
zeros. Therefore, this process of key verification is important
and required. The secret keys for the subsequent sessions are
computed as:
SKcni+1 = (DScni+1 ⊕ SKcni);
Generation of Dynamic Secrets and Secret Keys at the SN: In
a similar way to secret keys generation at the control node, the
supervisory node also generates the same set of secret keys.
The supervisory node generates a dynamic secret as:
DSsni = H(sn count);
Thereafter, the secret key is derived as:
SKsni = (DSsni ⊕ str);
The subsequent secret keys are derived as:
SKsni+1 = (DSsni+1 ⊕ SKsni);
We also design a secure cipher function for data encryption
and decryption, which converts each plaintext PTi (i = 1, 2,
..., d; d is the number of data values in each message of a
packet) into ciphertext CTi and vice versa, as follows:
At the control node:
CTi = fcipher(PTi, counteri, SKcni);
At the supervisory node:
PTi = fcipher(CTi, counteri, SKsni);
The definition of fcipher for encrypting each plaintext PTi
of a message into ciphertext CTi is as follows:
fcipher(PTi, counteri, SK){
CTi = (PTi + counteri)⊕ SK;
counteri ++;
return CTi; }
Here, counteri is used to change the original plaintext
before passing as input to the function fcipher, and gets
increment for each encryption of the plaintext message. The
counteri works as an initialization vector for each mes-
sage. The value of counteri is H(lseqno ⊕ lackno), where
lseqno and lackno are the sequence number and the ac-
knowledgement number of last successful delivered packet.
Our scheme, based on XOR and counteri, has computational
advantages over other modes of operations. The fcipher’s
computations on different plaintext messages can be obtained
in parallel, as the computation on each plaintext is inde-
pendent of other plaintext message. Decryption is indepen-
dent of the order of generating ciphertext, as each plaintext
message is added with a different value of counteri. Once
the supervisory node and the control node have a shared
dynamic secret (DSsni = DScni ), they also generate a
shared secret key as SKsni and SKcni , respectively. Each
control node sends H(idcni ||stri) to the supervisory node,
and then the supervisory node stores it in the database,
where idcni is the identity of the control node and stri
is a pre-shared string. Thereafter, the control node encrypts
message msgi and sends (idcni ||ESK [msgi]||hashi||tcn1 ) to
the supervisory node, where tcn1 is the timestamp and hashi
= H(idcni ||ESK [msgi]||tcn1). On receiving the message, the
supervisory node first computes H(idcni ||stri) and compares
it with the stored values. If it matches with one of the values,
the supervisory node stores idcni in its database and removes
the older stored value. The purpose of sending and computing
H(idcni ||stri) at initial stage is that the SN could verify not
only the sender’s identity but also the shared str. Also, it is not
a good idea of sending str as a plaintext over the network. In
order to improve security, we used H(idcni ||stri) for initial
communication. Once the SN confirms the identity of the
CN , it will use idcni for the subsequent communications
within the session until the expiry time of str. This process
reduces the overall computation overhead.
Figure 3 presents a communication scenario of transmitting
measurement values from the control node to the supervisory
node. First, analog data measurement values of different
components of the power system are sensed through sensors
and then digital values are stored in the memory of the control
node. Furthermore, the control node encrypts these values
using fcipher with recent SKcni key. Thereafter, the control
node generates several packets based on the maximum size
of payload and the total number of measurement values to be
sent, and then sends these packets to the supervisory node over
the communication network. On receiving such packets, the
supervisory node verifies the integrity of the received message
by computing hash
′
i and comparing it with the received hashi,
i.e., hashi
?
= hash
′
i. Then, the supervisory node extracts
measurement values from the packets, and decrypts their
original values using same function with SKsni key.
Our scheme achieves the following properties:
Storage and computation capabilities: The proposed scheme
is based on lightweight operations, such as XOR and addition.
Therefore, the scheme generates low overheads and needs less
storage.
Self management: The proposed scheme generates the dynamic
secret and the secret key after each short period of time. In the
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Fig. 3: Dynamic secret and secret key generation scheme.
worst case, even if the adversary compromises the secret key,
the system will be shortly recovered by self by regenerating
new dynamic secret and secret key.
Security: The proposed scheme is secure against eavesdrop-
ping (in worst case, it protects from a long time eavesdrop-
ping), man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack, and imperson-
ation attack.
Efficiency: The generation time of the dynamic secret and the
execution time of the proposed scheme will be very short, as
the scheme uses lightweight operations to be performed, such
as XOR, addition, and hash.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the security analysis of our
scheme considering the following properties:
Property 1: Adversary A cannot eavesdrop the communi-
cation channel for a long time.
Please note that there is no “secret exchange” during the
protocol run. Each end computes its own secret key without
sending it over the network. During the initial run of the
protocol, the supervisory and control nodes mutually agree on
a predefined starting value str (a set of octets), as an initial
secret that is derived using Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The
control node sends a random stream to the supervisory node
for generating a dynamic secret at both ends. In the worst
case scenario, A cannot eavesdrop the communication for a
long time. A can generate neither dynamic secrets nor secret
keys because of inevitable transmission errors in wireless
network. Note that the control node and the supervisory node
generate the same dynamic secret based on the str and the
counter value on successful transmission of each frame and
the packet, as well as each correct ack following stop-and-wait
and DNP3/C37.118 protocols. The dynamic secret depends
on the hash value of the counter not only the counter itself. A
single bit changed the counter value will result in a significant
change in the hash of the counter. In order to make the scheme
stronger, we consider the length of the counter to be at least
128 bits, which will provide 2128 possible combinations. The
actual counter value starts with (str+counter) value, where the
str is a random value pre-shared between the SN and the CN ,
and is different for each such pair per session. In our scheme,
the CN also sends a random stream to the SN , which will
make it difficult for the adversary to correctly guess and count
the value of the counter.
The proposed method does not rely on the adversary having
poor equipment, but the presence of random wireless trans-
mission errors. If an adversary tries to impersonate to an
entity, it will not be successful, because the adversary cannot
retrieve/derive the actual counter value. Hence, the adversary
cannot derive the actual session secret key. Even if we consider
that A generates the same dynamic secret, it cannot generate
the shared secret key for the current session because the
current secret key also depends upon the previous secret key
(or str during initialization phase) and a new dynamic secret.
Using previous and current dynamic secrets,A cannot generate
the secret key. In the worst scenario, if we consider that A
can obtain secret key and perform encryption/decryption, our
scheme self recovers from eavesdropping. The reason is that
in our scheme, dynamic secrets are generated frequently after
sending few packets. Hence, once the new secret key comes
into the effect, A can no longer eavesdrop the session.
Property 2: Our scheme provides security against malicious
communication injection. The scheme detects malicious injec-
tion performed by adversary A.
Our scheme provides encryption over the transmitted data
sent from the control node to the supervisory node. Malicious
communication injection is not possible, as A cannot correctly
decrypt the data values from the packet. If A sends a malicious
packet to the supervisory node, the supervisory node will
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discard the packet, as it will not be able to correctly decrypt
the packet. Therefore, our scheme is secure against malicious
communication injection.
Property 3: Adversary A cannot perform replay, MITM,
and impersonation attacks over the communication network
between the supervisory node and the control node.
In our scheme, each packet is sent with a timestamp
value from the control node to the supervisory node. This
timestamp value is valid till a short period of time based on the
propagation time between the respective control node and the
supervisory node. Once threshold time of accepting the packet
is over, the supervisory node discards the packet. If A sends a
previously captured packet to the supervisory node, the super-
visory node discards the packet as the timestamp is not valid.
Since communication from the control node to the supervisory
node is encrypted, A cannot successfully perform MITM
attack, and an attempt of establishing connections between
the control node and the supervisory node is discarded. In
the case of compromised router in a wireless communication
system, the adversary can drop, delay, or block the packet,
but it cannot extract the information from the packets over
the network. Our goal of preventing system against MITM is
to restrict him from extracting or modifying the transmitted
packets over the network. If A pretends as a control node
and sends a message, the supervisory node tries to decrypt the
message and makes an unsuccessful attempt. Also, hash of the
message will be different, if A modifies the packet values.
Property 4: Our encryption scheme is secure against
Chosen-Plaintext Attack (CPA), and is a CPA Indistinguishable
(CPA-IND) scheme.
We analyze the security of our scheme against CPA attack
in which adversary A selects various messages on which it
wishes to obtain encrypted messages while communicating
from the control node to the supervisory node. Our encryption
scheme generates sufficient randomness to the input message
based on counter value, and then XORed with the secret key
to finally generate the ciphertext. Note that we also monitor
the generated secret key and the ciphertext, and ensure that the
obtained ciphertext is significantly different from the original
message (plaintext). Since dynamic secrets and secret keys
change frequently, A cannot establish any relationship among
received encrypted messages. Our scheme also maintains a
security level of hash code to at least 160 bits and uses
collision free hash functions, such as SHA1, SHA256, and
SHA384.
Definition 1: A hash family H is (t, )-collision resistant, if
no adversary A at t-time has an advantage at least in breaking
the collision resistance of H.
Let H = H be a hash family of functions H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}n. We say that algorithm Algo has advantage  in
breaking the collision-resistance of H if
Pr[Algo(msg) = (msg0,msg1) : msg0 6= msg1,
H(msg0) = H(msg1)] ≥ ,
where Pr is the probability over a random choice of H() and
random bits of Algo. We consider random selection of hash
function from SHA1, SHA256, and SHA384. Our scheme is
secure and provides collision resistant hashing. Alternatively,
a hash chain can also be used [20].
Furthermore, the security of fcipher depends upon counteri
and SK (SKsni/SKcni ). In the proposed scheme, counteri
acts as a counter to enable Counter (CTR) mode-based ci-
phertext. Since A cannot guess the correct values of lseqno
and lackno due to wireless transmission errors, it cannot
compute correct counteri. Furthermore, A does not know
SKsni/SKcni , it can neither encrypt the plaintext with a
correct pair of (counteri, SK) nor decrypt the ciphertext
successfully. We can compute an upper bound on the number
of ciphertexts of a message that can be generated using a
single counteri and SK. The standard definition of the confi-
dentiality is given by the indistinguishabity from randomness.
The ciphertexts generated in our scheme are considered secure
against A, as it cannot distinguish ciphertexts from the output
of a truly random source. A has an advantage (difference of
true positive probability and false positive probability), if it can
distinguish them. We apply Bellare et al. [21] analysis to our
scheme and assume that the encryption function is a Pseudo-
Random Function (PRF), not a Peudo-Random Permutation
(PRP). Then,
Adv[PRF ](t, q) ≤ Adv[PRP ](t, q) + q22−l−1,
where q is the number of known plaintexts, t is the time used
to perform attack, l is the bit-length of the ciphertext of a
message, and the advantage when distinguishing mechanism
PRF/PRP from random is denoted as Adv[PRF/PRP]. Con-
sidering Adv[PRF] = , Adv[PRP](t, q) = 0, and l = {160,
256, 384} (as the size of a secret key), we get q = {√.280.5,√
.2128.5,
√
.2192.5}. Hence, A’s advantage is limited to ,
if we do not generate more than q ≈ {280, 2128, 2192}. A
true random source will produce two identical ciphertexts after
generating a total of {280, 2128, 2192} ciphertexts. Therefore,
in order to generate indistinguishable plaintext, we use at most
{280, 2128, 2192} ciphertexts.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND EXPERIMENTAL
ANALYSIS
This section presents the performance evaluation and exper-
imental analysis of the proposed scheme.
TABLE II: Parameters for Simulation Setup
Parameters Range Value Unit
Baud Rate 100-9600 bits/s
Propagation Delay 10-500 ms
MTU 50-500 bytes
Packet Size 500-5000 bytes
Number of packets 1-5 –
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Fig. 4: Generation of dynamic secret, secret key, and cipher-
text, and the total execution time of our scheme.
A. Performance Evaluation
Our dynamic secret and encryption scheme requires two
hash functions for generating dynamic secrets, two XOR
operations for deriving secret keys, and two XOR and two
addition operations for performing encryption and decryption
of data at the control node as well as the supervisory node. In
addition, two hash functions are required for message integrity
over the communication network. In our scheme, we consider
a set of hash algorithms, such as {SHA1, SHA256, SHA384}
for selecting a hash function H().
B. Experimental Analysis
In this work, we develop an experimental setup with a co-
simulator. The co-simulator uses JDK1.7 with Java, Java Agent
Development Framework (JADE), MATLAB, and PowerWorld
to implement communication scenarios between the control
nodes and the supervisory node. Table II describes the selected
ranges of communication parameters for our simulation, where
C37.118 protocol supports packets with message passing [23].
We generate dynamic secrets by computing SHA1, SHA256,
and SHA384 hash functions. Thereafter, we generate secret
keys and the ciphertexts of the data, and compute the total
execution time of our scheme. Figure 4 shows simulation
results in which dynamic secrets are obtained using all three
hash functions, i.e., SHA1, SHA256, and SHA384 with (a)
variable number of messages in each packet (range 1-5),
(b) variable size of packets (range 500-5000 bytes), and (c)
variable size of Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) per frame
(range 50-500 bytes). Furthermore, Figure 4 (d) computes a
(a) GUI: sending data and outputting lines statistics.
(b) Lines statistics are changes by adversary.
(c) A successful attempt of ma-
licious data transmission.
(d) A successful attempt of le-
gitimate data transmission.
Fig. 5: A GUI of our scheme: transmission of a malicious and
legitimate measurement data from the CN to the SN.
secret key, the ciphertext of the data, and the overall execution
time of our scheme. The generation times for the dynamic
secret by SHA1, SHA256, and SHA384 are between 0.2 ms to
4 ms. The execution time of the proposed scheme is ranged
between 0.01 sec to 0.011 sec. The results show that DS-SHA1
outperforms DS-SHA256 and DS-SHA384. We can prefer DS-
SHA1 till the end of the year 2016 as it will be no more secure
and useful [24]. But, we also use other two functions to enable
dynamic selection of a hash function in our scheme. Figure 5
presents a GUI for sending measurement data, change in line
statistics by adversary, and successful attempts of malicious
and legitimate data transmission.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have described an efficient and secure scheme for
the communications between supervisory and control nodes
in smart grid applications. Frequent generation of dynamic
secrets and secret keys of the encryption scheme provides
sufficient security to the measurement values that are sent from
the control node to the supervisory node. The generation of
dynamic secrets is based on the fact that the inevitable and
unpredictable errors in the wireless communication prevents
the system against tracing and obtaining the secrets by the
adversary. The security analysis ensures that the proposed
scheme defeats man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, ma-
licious injection communications, and impersonation attacks
over the wireless network. Furthermore, performance evalu-
ation and experimental analysis of our simulation show that
the processes of generating dynamic secrets, secret keys, and
ciphertexts are lightweight. It results in lower and manage-
able overheads, and enables fast execution. We use all three
functions in our scheme to provide randomness of selecting
hash function where DS-SHA1 is efficient than DS-SHA256
and DS-SHA384.
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